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Child Soldiers to War Criminals: Trauma and 
the Case for Personal Mitigation 
 




Child soldiers are recruited worldwide to serve 
in armed forces as porters, guards, and 
combatants. While in the armed forces, they 
witness acts of extreme violence; are subject to 
physical, mental, and sexual abuse; are forced 
to take drugs or alcohol; and ultimately become 
perpetrators themselves. If these individuals 
remain in the armed forces they can become the 
next generation of militia leaders and those 
most responsible for international crimes. 
Eventually, they may be vulnerable to 
indictment for war crimes, crimes against 
humanity, and genocide. This article contends 
that courts should consider mitigation in 
sentencing for former child soldiers, even for 
crimes committed as adults. First, psychological 
studies on childhood trauma demonstrate that 
the violence that these children witness and are 
subjected to makes them vulnerable to mental 
illness, which in turn increases the likelihood 
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that they will commit crimes as adults. Growing 
up surrounded by violence also means that these 
individuals see violence as the norm and are 
less able to develop a functioning sense of 
morality. Second, personal mitigation has been 
used in cases in the developed world to reduce 
sentences for individuals who experienced 
childhood trauma, are abuse victims, or suffer 
from mental illness. The extreme violence 
experienced by child soldiers and their inability 
to develop a functioning sense of morality 
indicate that personal mitigation is also 
appropriate in these cases. Finally, this article 
addresses potential objections to the use of 
personal mitigation in cases of former child 
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I.  Introduction 
 
When he was sixteen or seventeen years old, a Sierra 
Leonean boy named Issa Sesay was forcibly recruited into the 
Revolutionary United Front (“RUF”) rebel group. More than twenty-
five years later, Sesay, who had risen to be a senior commander in 
the RUF, was indicted by the Special Court for Sierra Leone and 
sentenced to fifty-two years in prison for crimes against humanity 
and war crimes, including recruiting child soldiers.2 
Throughout the world, children are used as guards, porters, 
and soldiers in violent armed conflicts. An estimated 300,000 child 
soldiers are currently fighting worldwide, more than fifty percent of 
them in Africa3 and an estimated sixty percent of non-state armies 
worldwide use child soldiers.4 The recent International Criminal 
Court (“ICC”) judgment of Thomas Lubanga drew attention to this 
issue: Lubanga was the first person found guilty by the court and was 
charged with the war crime of conscripting children under the age of 
fifteen.5 Many conflicts that involve child soldiers, like that in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (“DRC”), have continued for decades 
and currently show no signs of slowing or stopping. This means that 
the next militia leaders indicted by the ICC may be those who, like 
Sesay, were abducted as children and forced into the armed forces.  
As Lubanga’s case demonstrates, recruiting children is itself 
a serious international crime, and child soldiers who are removed 
from armed forces while they are still children are treated, rightfully, 
as victims. Children are believed to be less culpable than adults and 
do not have the necessary state of mind to commit many crimes.6 Of 
course, child soldiers who do not have the good fortune to escape 
their militia and be rehabilitated are subject to the same trauma as 
                                                
2 WAR DON DON (Salone Films 2010). 
3 Diane Marie Amann, Calling Children to Account: The Proposal for a Juvenile 
Chamber in the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 29 PEPP. L. REV. 167, 171 (2001).  
4 P.W. SINGER, CHILDREN AT WAR, 95 (2005). 
5 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment 
Pursuant to Article 74 of the Statute, ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012), http://www.icc-
cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc1379838.pdf.  
6 Matthew Happold, Child Soldiers: Victims or Perpetrators? 29 U. LA VERNE L. 
REV. 56, 72 (2008). Note, however, that many serious international crimes do not 
have culpability requirements.  
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those who are rescued and treated as victims. However, as Sesay’s 
case shows, their status as victims ends when they enter adulthood 
and are unwilling or unable, physically or mentally, to remove 
themselves from the armed forces. This shift in status occurs despite 
the fact that exposure to extreme violence at a young age can have 
profound effects on an individual’s adult behavior: exposure to 
violent crime as a child increases the likelihood of developing Post-
Traumatic Stress Disorder (“PTSD”), depression, anxiety, and other 
mood disorders, which may contribute to future violence.7 Exposure 
to violence may also impair individuals’ ideological development 
and ability to develop a functioning sense of morality.8 
This paper argues that due to the psychological effects of 
being a child soldier, status as a former child soldier should be 
considered a mitigating factor when sentencing individuals for 
crimes committed as adults. Other jurisdictions have used this type 
of personal mitigation for individuals with mental disorders or 
violent childhoods,9 so it is well suited to cases of former child 
soldiers. It would also further the purposes of criminal law by 
punishing individuals according to their moral blameworthiness. 
Section II will provide background on child soldiers, the problems 
they may develop and the effect of these problems on brain 
development and adult behavior. Section III will present an argument 
for mitigation in sentencing for former child soldiers. Section IV will 
conclude and offer recommendations to judges, prosecutors and 
defense attorneys involved in cases of former child soldiers.  
 
  A.  Note on Methodology 
 
To discuss the psychological implications of being a child 
soldier, I will use examples of children’s experiences in combat in 
Uganda, Sierra Leone, and Mozambique. I will also look to 
psychology literature on the effects of violence on children, as well 
as interviews and studies conducted with rescued child soldiers, to 
discuss how individuals who remain in the armed forces until 
adulthood may psychologically develop. However, there are several 
                                                
7 See infra Part II.  
8 Id.  
9 See infra Part III.  
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limiting factors to this body of work. First, most research available 
about the mental health of child soldiers is conducted with 
individuals who are rescued or released from armed forces while they 
are still children. Most interviews are done in conjunction with 
rehabilitation efforts and children are interviewed almost exclusively 
as victims. It is very difficult, therefore, to determine how prolonged 
and continued activity in the armed forces from childhood into 
adulthood affects individuals’ development. In short, we only know 
what happens if we cut short the cycle of violence when the 
individual is still a child and still legally viewed as someone who 
cannot be held fully responsible for his or her actions. This article 
seeks to examine the ramifications of that cycle continuing 
indefinitely until it produces a fully culpable adult.   
Second, the studies that do focus on the effects of violence on 
children who remain in their violent communities until adulthood 
tend to be conducted in developed countries, such as the United 
States or United Kingdom. For example, studies show that many 
currently incarcerated adults experienced trauma or mental illness as 
a child.10 While they provide useful insight into the potential effects 
of early exposure to violence and mental illness on behavior and 
development, these studies are difficult to apply to the life of a child 
soldier. While children everywhere experience hardship and abuse, 
the violence experienced by child soldiers is often on a completely 
different scale than that in even the worst parts of the developed 
world. 
Therefore, these two bodies of work provide complementary, 
but not exhaustive, information. From one we may learn about the 
effects of extreme violence, but only on children; the other 
demonstrates how violence can affect adults, but not at the same 
level of trauma. In this article I will attempt to merge these 
perspectives to determine, to the extent possible, how an adult is 
affected by growing up in the extreme violence of a military group.  
 
II.  Child Soldiers and the Psychological Effects of Service in 
Armed Forces11 
                                                
10 See infra Part II. A.  
11 There is, of course, controversy as to what age legally constitutes childhood. 
The Rome Statute of the ICC makes it a crime to recruit anyone under the age of 
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 Child soldiers are often forcibly abducted from their homes, 
schools, and villages to serve. For example, in Mozambique, sixty-
four percent of children in one study had joined armed forces 
through abduction.12 In many cases, the ease of their recruitment is 
what appeals to leaders of armed forces. Recruiting children 
eliminates the need for armed forces to convince people to join their 
armies or campaign about their causes. It is inexpensive and easy to 
abduct an army of children, allowing “groups that would have been 
easily defeated in the past [to] now emerge as very real 
contenders.”13 Thus, the use of child soldiers can actually increase 
the frequency of armed conflicts. These armies can also easily recruit 
new groups of children if their numbers are reduced, thus prolonging 
conflicts by sustaining groups that would otherwise have been 
                                                                                                             
fifteen, and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”) says that states 
should take all possible measures to avoid using individuals under fifteen in the 
armed forces. Nienke Grossman, Rehabilitation or Revenge: Prosecuting Child 
Soldiers for Human Rights Violations, 38 GEO. J. INT’L L. 323, 339, 346 (2007); 
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 8(b)(xxvi), entered into 
force July 1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90; Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 
38, entered into force Sept. 2, 1990, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3. However, the CRC classifies 
a child as under eighteen. Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 1. The 
Special Court for Sierra Leone allowed individuals over fifteen to stand trial, 
taking their young age into account. Michael Custer, Punishing Child Soldiers: 
The Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Lessons to be Learned from the United 
States’ Judicial System, 19 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 449, 454 (2005). While it is 
beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the benefits of different age 
classifications, it is important to note that many of the situations described in this 
paper involved children who fit well within any classification of a child. For 
example, the mean age of children abducted in Uganda was 12.9 years old, and the 
mean length of service was two years. Ilse Derluyn et al., Post Traumatic Stress in 
Former Ugandan Child Soldiers, 363 THE LANCET 861, 861 (2004) (in this study, 
the authors interviewed 301 former child soldiers who had served with the LRA to 
collect demographic information and then randomly selected seventy-five 
individuals to fill out the Impact of Event Scale – Revised (IES-R) survey, which 
allowed them to self-report their symptoms after traumatic events. This data was 
collected from the seventy-one individuals who agreed to participate).  
12 Neil Boothby, What Happens When Child Soldiers Grow Up? The Mozambique 
Case Study, 4 INTERVENTION 244, 248 (2006). This study collected data from 
thirty-nine male former child soldiers between 1988 and 2004. The individuals 
were selected from detention centers in southern Mozambique.  
13 Singer, supra note 4.  
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destroyed by loss of fighters.14 Additionally, children are easier to 
control than adults and are less likely to understand the risks of 
armed conflict.15 
While the development of lightweight arms means that 
children can more easily play an active role in conflict situations, 
children serve a variety of roles in armies.16 For example, in Sierra 
Leone, children served as “front line combatants, commanders of 
other child soldiers, spies, porters, cooks, domestic servants, and 
care-takers of younger children.”17 Whether children are likely to see 
combat depends on the individual conflict, but regardless of their 
role, they are constantly subjected to violence as a form of control. 
Violence can include beatings, sexual assault, threats, and forced 
intake of drugs or alcohol; “an aura of menace and violence, whether 
verbal, physical, psychological, and/or sexual, [becomes] an integral 
feature of daily interaction”.18 For example, in Mozambique, fifty-
one percent of children interviewed in one study were subjected to 
physical violence or torture.19 
Child soldiers also witness violence toward others, which can 
cause further trauma. Abducted children are usually taken “under 
circumstances of extreme coercion, violence, and fear,” and see their 
families or community members killed.20 A study in Uganda showed 
that while serving in the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”), a group 
notorious for using child soldiers, children were exposed to six 
different traumatic events on average. Seventy-seven percent saw a 
person killed and six percent saw a member of their immediate 
                                                
14 Id. at 98. 
15 Matthew Happold, Excluding Children from Refugee Status: Child Soldiers and 
Article 1F of the Refugee Convention, 17 AM. U. INT'L L. REV. 1131, 1144 (2002).  
16 Grossman, supra note 11, at 327, noting that “[o]f the 140 Liberation Tigers 
Tamil Eelaam (LTTE) soldiers killed during a battle at Ampakamam, Sri Lanka in 
October 1999, 49 were children; 32 of those children were girls between the ages 
of eleven and fifteen.”  
17 Myriam Denov, Coping with the Trauma of War: Former Child Soldiers in Post-
Conflict Sierra Leone, 53 INT’L SOC. WORK 791, 794 (2010). In this study forty 
boys and forty girls who had formerly served with the RUF while under eighteen 
were interviewed.  
18 Id.  
19 Boothby, supra note 12.  
20 Denov, supra note 17.  
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family killed.21 The statistics are similar in Mozambique, where an 
estimated seventy-seven percent of children witnessed murder, 
“often in large numbers.” Sixty-three percent witnessed sexual abuse 
or rape.22 
However, child soldiers are also perpetrators of some of the 
most violent crimes in these conflicts. In Uganda, an estimated 
thirty-nine percent of those interviewed had killed another person, 
while sixty-four percent were involved in combat. Two percent were 
forced to kill a close relative.23 Similarly, children in Mozambique 
were trained to act without question and with no emotion, and even 
after they were rehabilitated, many continued to identify primarily as 
members of the Mozambican National Resistance (“RENAMO”) 
rebel group rather than victims of a conflict.24 
While children are initially forced to commit these crimes, 
often with the aid of drugs or alcohol, some report that later they 
began to enjoy killing.25 Rehabilitated children often report that they 
still feel responsible for what they have done, despite the fact that 
rescuers assure them that they are innocent victims. “In instances 
where the former child soldiers had decided to commit horrendous 
acts themselves, it was clear to them and to others, what they had 
done. They would then discuss among themselves ‘the feeling of 
acting independently.’”26 The progression from innocent victim to 
perpetrator is therefore not always linear. Children are instructed to 
commit crimes constantly, and it is easy for them to get caught up in 
the message and instruction of their armed forces and willingly, even 
eagerly, commit crimes. This does not necessarily mean, however, 
that they are completely converted. Many later regret their acts and 
can then repeat this cycle. “[C]hildren continually [drift] between 
committing acts of violence, and simultaneously being victims of 
violence by others.” 27  A statement by a child in Sierra Leone 
                                                
21 Derluyn, et al. supra note 11.  
22 Boothby, supra note 12.  
23 Derluyn et al., supra note 11.  
24 Boothby, supra note 12, at 248–49.  
25 Denov, supra note 17, at 795. 
26  Grace Akello et al., Reintegration of Former Child Soldiers in Northern 
Uganda: Coming to Terms with Children’s Agency and Accountability, 4 
INTERVENTION 229, 238 (2006).  
27 Denov, supra note 17, at 795.  
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exemplifies the movement from victim to perpetrator: “I was in an 
ambush and bullets were flying back and forth, people were 
shooting. I didn't want to pull the trigger at all but when you watch 
kids . . . being shot and killed and . . . dying and crying and their 
blood was spilling all over your face you just moved beyond, 
something just pushed you and you start pulling the trigger.”28 
Thus self-preservation can be mingled with an actual thirst 
for killing, and children’s emotions can shift rapidly and repeatedly 
between shame about their actions to enjoyment of violence. 29 
Children are constantly influenced by their surroundings. 30 
Therefore, it may be that an act can seem heroic when the child 
commits it, later become abhorrent, and still later be re-glorified if it 
is praised or retold. Because these shifts occur when children are still 
developing a sense of morality and ideology, children are not only 
impaired from acting “morally” but also from developing a sense of 
what they believe is and is not “moral”.31 
 
 A.  Exposure to Violence and Mental Disorders 
 
 Prolonged childhood trauma can alter immune, 
neuroendocrine, and central nervous system functions and can lead to 
physical and mental health problems in adulthood.32 The effects of 
                                                
28 Grossman, supra note 11, at 328.  
29 Denov, supra note 17, at 795–96. 
30 See generally Cathy Spatz Widom, Does Violence Begat Violence? A Critical 
Examination of the Literature, 106 PSYCHOL. BULL. 3 (1989) (discussing the role 
that an upbringing in a violent environment may play in children’s future 
tendencies towards violence.)  
31 See infra Part II. 1.  
32 Christine Heim & Charles B. Nemeroff, The Role of Childhood Trauma in the 
Neurobiology of Mood and Anxiety Disorders: Preclinical and Clinical Studies, 49 
SOC’Y BIOLOGICAL PSYCHOL. 1023, 1023–24 (2001). See also, e.g., Vincent J. 
Felitti et al., Relationship of Childhood Abuse and Household Dysfunction to Many 
of the Leading Causes of Death in Adults: the Adverse Childhood Experiences 
(ACE) Study, 14 AM. J. PREVENTATIVE MED. 245 (1998); P.E. Mullen et al., The 
Long-Term Impact of the Physical, Emotional, and Sexual Abuse of Children: A 
Community Study, 20 CHILD. ABUSE NEGLECT. 7 (1996); B.E. Saunders et al., 
Child Sexual Assault as a Risk Factor for Mental Disorders Among Women: A 
Community Survey, 7 J. INTERPERSONAL VIOLENCE 189 (1992); M.B. Stein et al., 
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trauma can be manifested as depression, anxiety, PTSD, Attention 
Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (“ADHD”), and behavioral disorders, 
as well as other problems such as schizophrenia and substance 
abuse.33 
PTSD is an anxiety disorder caused by experiencing or 
witnessing a traumatic event.34 Symptoms of PTSD include re-living 
the event or events, avoiding triggers reminding one of the event, or 
hyper-arousal. 35  These symptoms may manifest themselves in 
emotional unavailability, forgetting the event, trouble sleeping, or 
violent outbursts. 36  As discussed above, many child soldiers 
demonstrate these symptoms or behavior. A study of former child 
soldiers in Uganda found that ninety-seven percent showed PTSD 
symptoms.37 
It is difficult to know exactly which events are PTSD 
precursors or worsen it. Generally, there is a correlation between 
seeing more highly “toxic” violent events—for example, seeing a 
family member killed or becoming disabled—and experiencing 
higher levels of PTSD.38 In Sierra Leone and Uganda, it was found 
that exposure to more violent events was an indicator of the PTSD 
severity.39 PTSD has also been associated with violent tendencies 
later in life.40 
                                                                                                             
Childhood Physical and Sexual Abuse in Patients with Anxiety Disorders in a 
Community Sample, 153 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 275 (1996). 
33 Heim & Nemeroff, supra note 32, at 1023–24.  
34NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. DEPT. OF HEATH AND HUMAN 
SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, NIH PUBLICATION NO. 08 6388, POST-
TRAUMATIC STRESS DISORDER 1. 
35 Id. at 1–2.  
36 Id.  
37 Derluyn et al., supra note 11, at 862.  
38 Theresa S. Betancourt et al., Research Review: Psychosocial Adjustment and 
Mental Health in Former Child Soldiers – A Systematic Review of the Literature 
and Recommendations for Future Research, 54 J. CHILD. PHYSIOLOGY & 
PSYCHOL., 17, 28, 30 (2013). Note that the author feels that more work need be 
done in this area.  
39 Id. at 27. 
40 Marie E. Reuve & Randon S. Welton, Violence and Mental Illness, 5 PSYCHOL. 
34, 39  (2008).   
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In a Ugandan study, eighty percent of child soldiers exposed 
to trauma showed signs of depression.41 Other problems identified 
were “abnormal grief reactions, academic impairment, fear and 
dependent behaviour, physical symptoms e.g. loss of appetite and 
multiple physical complaints, suicidal ideation and moral 
development/loss of childhood.”42 Even four years after being in 
conflict, many child soldiers still experienced “nightmares, 
flashbacks, hyperarousal, depression, and anxiety.” 43  In Sierra 
Leone, many former child soldiers experienced nightmares and the 
feeling that they were being haunted.44 Instances of depression were 
also often accompanied by anxiety.45 In Mozambique, some rescued 
children experienced “impaired social functioning” and were unable 
to stop their violent behavior, reintegrate into their communities, or 
cope with day-to-day life.46 The children who exhibited the most 
severe problems were those who led other children while in the 
armed forces and those who were abducted at an especially young 
age. In one case, a child who displayed particularly significant 
difficulty functioning socially was abducted when he was only six 
years old.47 
There is a strong connection between these disorders and 
propensity toward crime later in life. A study from a U.S. juvenile 
                                                
41 John D. McMullen et al., Screening for Traumatic Exposure and Psychological 
Distress among War-Affected Adolescents in Post-Conflict Northern Uganda, 47 
SOC. PSYCHIATRY & PSYCHIATRIC EPIDEMIOLOGY 1489, 1491 (2012). The authors 
conducted a study of 205 adolescents aged 12–19 from a school in Gulu in 
Northern Uganda. See generally NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, U.S. 
DEPT. OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, NIH 
PUBLICATION NO. 11-3561, DEPRESSION 5 (describing symptoms of depression and 
its association with trauma). 
42 Id., at 1490. 
43 Id., at 1495. 
44 See generally Denov, supra note 17 (discussing the effects of armed conflict on 
children in Sierra Leone, and how they coped with the psychological problems 
caused by serving in armed forces); NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH, 
U.S. DEPT. OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERVICES, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF HEALTH, 
NIH PUBLICATION NO. 09-3879, ANXIETY DISORDERS (describing general 
symptoms and types of anxiety, including those associated with trauma). 
45 Akello et al., supra note 26, at 237.  
46 Boothby, supra note 12, at 252.  
47 Id.  
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justice system in Illinois showed that sixty percent of males and 
more than sixty-six percent of females in the system experience a 
psychiatric disorder, including depression, psychotic disorders, 
anxiety, ADHD, and disruptive behavioral disorders. 48  These 
statistics may be underestimations; they do not include individuals 
who committed crimes and were released, or were sent straight to 
mental health facilities.49 However, they do illustrate the strong 
correlation between these disorders and propensity to commit crime.  
 One way of controlling child soldiers is to force them to take 
drugs and alcohol in order to reduce fear and impulse control. Many 
rescued children return from armed forces with addictions. As one 
child in Sierra Leone put it, “[w]hen I go to battle fields, I smoke 
enough. That’s why I become unafraid of everything . . . When you 
refuse to take drugs, it’s called technical sabotage and you are 
killed.”50 Use of drugs and alcohol can lead to substance abuse, 
which is also correlated with violent crime.51 
 The relationship between depression, behavioral disorders, 
anxiety, ADHD, PTSD, addiction, and violent behavior can be self-
fulfilling. Individuals who see extreme violence are at an increased 
risk of developing disorders and having a disorder increases the risk 
of developing violent behavior. While some children who enter the 
armed forces may be predisposed to these problems, the life of a 
child soldier is so violent and the recruitments so random that it is 
unlikely that the relationship between psychological disorders, 
violence, and a history in the armed forces is coincidental.52  Many 
of these disorders also impair an individual’s ability to think 
                                                
48 Linda A. Teplin et al., Psychiatric Disorders in Youth in Juvenile Detention, 59 
ARCHIVES GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1133, 1136–37 (2002). Note that the juvenile justice 
system deals with individuals under the age of eighteen. The authors conducted a 
study of 1,829 youth between the ages of ten and eighteen, 1,172 male and 657 
females, detained in Cook County, IL.  
49 Id.  
50 Ismene Zarfis, Sierra Leone’s Search for Justice and Accountability for Child 
Soldiers, 9 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 18, 19 (2002). 
51 Reuve & Welton, supra note 40.  
52 While some children may volunteer for the army, many are abducted from 
schools or villages on raids where the armies have no prior connection to the 
children and do not select them based on their suitability for armed forces. 
Therefore, for the purposes this discussion regarding mental health, children are 
recruited randomly. See, e.g., Boothby, supra note 12.  
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rationally, which may prevent the individual from understanding the 
ramifications of his or her actions. Studies are also split on how 
factors such as age, gender, or time spent in armed forces affect 
psychological problems.53 
 
  B.  Aggression and Ideological Development 
 
 Another trend to consider is the correlation between trauma, 
childhood aggression and adult crimes. It is clear that childhood 
aggression can be an indicator of a criminal future. For example, 
conflicts between parents or a home life characterized by violence, 
aggression or neglect can influence a child’s tendency toward 
aggression and committing crimes as an adult.54 One U.S. study 
showed that almost fifty percent of former abused or neglected 
children had committed a non-traffic offense in the past six years.55 
A study in London also showed a correlation between childhood 
aggression, as reported by a child’s teacher and peers, and criminal 
activity as an adult.56 
Furthermore, the level of violence a child experiences as a 
victim or observer can influence his or her aggression. It is likely that 
this tendency toward violence is due in large part to the models that 
                                                
53 For example, some studies show that children who are recruited at a younger age 
or spend more time in the armed forces are more disposed to mental problems 
later. Female child soldiers often report higher levels of trauma than male child 
soldiers. However, being subjected to sexual violence is also an indication of 
higher trauma, and it is likely that victims of sexual violence are usually girls. See, 
e.g., Denov, supra note 17, at 795. Girls are also often subjected to increased 
stigma when they return from the armed forces because they are seen as sexually 
impure. Betancourt, supra note 38, at 27–28.  
54  David P. Farrington, Childhood Aggression and Adult Violence: Early 
Precursors and Later-Life Outcomes, in DEV. & TREATMENT CHILDHOOD 
AGGRESSION 5, 6 (Debra J. Pepler & Kenneth H. Rubin eds., 1991)..  
55 Michael G. Maxfield & Cathy Spatz Widom, The Cycle of Violence: Revisited 6 
Years Later, 150 ARCHIVES PEDIATRIC & ADOLESCENT MED. 390, 393 (1996). 
56 Farrington, supra note 54, at 5. Note, however, that this connection is by no 
means definite, and it cannot be said that children who are exposed to violence will 
invariably be criminals. “Being abused as a child may increase one’s risk for 
becoming an abusive parent, a delinquent, or an adult violent criminal. However, 
on the basis of the findings from the existing literature, it cannot be said that the 
pathway is straight or certain.” Widom, supra note 30, at 24. 
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children receive from the adults in their lives: “[c]hildren learn 
behavior, at least in part, by imitating someone else’s behavior. Thus, 
children learn to be aggressive by observing aggression.” 57 
Aggressive children may then become desensitized to violence, 
reinforcing the pattern.58 As one child in Sierra Leone said, “I didn’t 
have the mind to kill someone initially . . . but later on I enjoyed the 
wicked acts.”59 Children become accustomed to life in the armed 
forces and the extreme levels of violence become normalized.60 In 
2006, one survey reported that seventy percent of inmates in the 
Gulu District juvenile prison were former child soldiers. 61  In 
Mozambique, many rescued soldiers continued to “use aggression as 
a principal means of exerting control and social influence.”62  
Growing up in an environment as violent as the one that 
many child soldiers experience also affects their ability to reason and 
develop a sense of morality. Young children generally are not fully 
able to create an ideology that they can stand by. This capability 
changes in adolescence.63 “A child’s grasp of the political world 
changes dramatically between ages twelve or thirteen and fifteen or 
sixteen; a child’s cognitive mode changes, his or her authoritarian 
views of the political system sharply decline, and he or she achieves 
a capacity for ideology.” 64  Joseph Adelson describes the 
development of the political ideology of adolescents as a new 
capacity for “moral and conceptual relativism.”65 Children abducted 
at a young age will likely not have developed this “capacity for 
ideology” at the time of the abduction and will reach the age when 
this sense of ideology would normally develop while still active in 
the armed forces. Thus their sense of ideology is likely to be based 
                                                
57 Widom, supra note 30, at 4. 
58 Patricia J. Falk, Novel Theories of Criminal Defense Based on the Toxicity of the 
Social Environment: Urban Psychosis, Television Intoxication, and Black Rage, 74 
N.C. L. REV. 731, 769–770, 783 (1996).  
59 Denov, supra note 17, at 795.  
60 Widom, supra note 30, at 4.  
61 Akello et al., supra note 26, at 229.  
62 Boothby, supra note 12, at 249.  
63 Grossman, supra note 11, at 347, 48.  
64 Id. at 347.  
65  Joseph Adelson, The Political Imagination of the Young Adolescent, 100 
TWELVE TO SIXTEEN: EARLY ADOLESCENCE 1013, 1021 (1971).  
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on an environment characterized by extreme violence and physical 
and mental manipulation. 
Furthermore, children at this age often take cues about right 
and wrong and their “moral intensity” from their parents;66 in the 
absence of parents, these cues may come from commanders or other 
soldiers who not only expose children to massive acts of violence but 
teach them that the children should commit these acts too.67 Child 
soldiers may be taught that they are freedom fighters, killing those 
who are destroying their country or creating a threat, and thus any 
means they use are justified. For example, one twelve-year-old child 
in Sierra Leone reported, “I didn’t know what I was fighting for. The 
rebels just told us that we were fighting for the people. I don’t know 
what the war was all about because at the time, I was not really old 
enough to understand these things.”68 Another child mentioned being 
taught to hate and differentiate themselves from those they fought: 
“[w]e were told that if we touched these people they can’t feel pain. 
They were different than us.”69 Therefore, children who grow up in 
this environment are highly unlikely to be able to develop a 
functional moral compass and determine whether their actions, as 
children or in the future, are right or wrong.  
 Many crimes require a certain state of culpability, mens rea, 
for the individual to be declared guilty. Most people agree that 
children do not have the necessary mental capacity for mens rea.70 In 
Roper v. Simmons, the U.S. Supreme Court held that it was 
unconstitutional to impose the death sentence for crimes committed 
when the perpetrator was less than eighteen years old, stating that 
juveniles were less culpable than adults.71 The Court said the same 
when it concluded that life without parole was unconstitutional for 
juvenile offenders. 72  The same principle applies for crimes 
committed by child soldiers: “[t]here would seem to be no 
disagreement that almost all of these child soldiers are a great deal 
                                                
66 Id. at 1031. 
67 See infra notes 29–30 and accompanying text.  
68 SINGER, supra note 4, at 99.  
69 Id. at 103. 
70 Happold, supra note 6. Note, however, that many serious international crimes do 
not require a specific state of mind. Id. 
71 Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 568 (2005). 
72 See Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012).  
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less than fully culpable for the actions they might be charged with, 
and . . . are more appropriately viewed as victims than as 
perpetrators.”73  
However, this issue becomes more complicated when the 
individuals in question are adults who were abducted as children but 
remain in the armed forces into adulthood. Though they may suffer 
from various mental disorders and have impaired ideological 
development, these problems do not necessarily impact their 
culpability as adults. The next section suggests the alternative 
solution of mitigating sentences, rather than reducing culpability, for 
former child soldiers.  
 
III.  The Case for Mitigation 
 
 While there is little data that discusses the psychological 
implications of growing up in the armed forces through adulthood, it 
is clear that the exposure to violence can have profound effects on an 
individual’s mental development, understanding of ideology, ability 
to make decisions, and mental health. Therefore, I argue that an 
individual’s status as a former child soldier should be considered a 
mitigating factor when determining punishment, even for crimes 
committed as adults. The upbringing of child soldiers can render 
them fundamentally unable to make moral decisions regarding their 
behavior, and they often suffer from mental disorders that impair 
their ability to think rationally, increasing their risk of violent 
behavior. 
This is not to say that a child soldier’s culpability should be 
lessened. Even if their decision-making and morality are 
compromised, many former child soldiers committing crimes 
certainly do so knowingly or purposefully. I do not, therefore, 
believe that former child soldiers should be charged with lesser 
crimes, or they should be considered to have acted at a lower 
culpability level. However, personal background and mental illness 
has been, and should be considered in mitigating the sentence of 
child soldiers.  
                                                
73 Custer, supra note 11, at 471.  
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 Childhood trauma as a mitigating factor in sentencing is not 
new. Personal mitigation is sentencing mitigation based on a 
particular characteristic of the accused. In a study of the United 
Kingdom’s Crown Court, Jessica Jacobson and Mike Hough of the 
Institute for Criminal Policy Research found that there may be a case 
for personal mitigation if the individual demonstrates remorse, has a 
responsibility to take care of a family, is particularly young, or lacks 
a criminal background.74 Mitigation can also be based on whether the 
individual has had a “difficult or deprived background” or a history 
of substance abuse, especially if the individual is willing to seek 
treatment.75 A childhood in foster care or with abusive parents has 
also been used as a significant mitigating factor, as have illiteracy 
and severe depression.76 Personal mitigation is also used in U.S. 
cases, most notably in capital cases where individuals with mental 
health difficulties, for example, may be granted life in prison rather 
than given the death penalty.77 Serious crimes like murder can also 
be mitigated slightly; for example, an individual may be given life in 
prison with the option of parole at the earliest opportunity,78 or a 
reduction of a charge, such as from murder to reckless homicide.79 
 However, personal mitigation is not without controversy. 
Jacobson and Hough also recognize that mental health and a difficult 
                                                
74 JESSICA JACOBSON & MIKE HOUGH, PRISON TRUST REFORM, MITIGATION: THE 
ROLE OF PERSONAL FACTORS IN SENTENCING ix, 9, 13 (2007).  
75 Id.  
76 Id. at 15–16.  
77  See generally Phyllis L. Crocker, Childhood Abuse and Adult Murder: 
Implications for the Death Penalty, 77 N.C. L. REV. 1143 (1999) (describing the 
case for mitigation in death penalty cases based on childhood abuse and mental 
illness and how it has been used in the United States).  
78 For example, in the unpublished case of Felicia Morgan, a teenager who killed 
another teenager when attempting to take her coat, the judge granted her the option 
of parole after thirteen years and four months rather than the maximum sixty years 
based on her history of child abuse and growing up in a violent environment. Falk, 
supra note 58, at 738–39. While it is important to note that in this case the crime 
was committed while Morgan was still a minor, it still provides an illustration of 
how mitigation factors may impact sentencing in serious crimes. Id.  
79 In another unpublished case, Turhan Taylor killed a sexual partner while 
experiencing a PTSD flashback to his prior sexual abuse, and the prosecutor 
reduced his charge after hearing evidence of his mental state. Falk, supra note 58, 
at 739–40. Note that Taylor was an adult when this crime was committed, and 
much of his abuse occurred while he was a child. Id. 
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background, while significant when they are considered, are used 
infrequently to mitigate sentences.80 Judges give several reasons for 
this, including lack of sympathy for those who are unable to 
overcome a poor background and the lack of available care for 
mental illness, leaving the prison system as the only option.81 This is 
also a response in U.S. courts. In one study, two-thirds of jurors on 
capital cases said they did not take into consideration a background 
of child abuse when sentencing, though this number was slightly 
lower if the defendant had been unable to receive help with mental 
problems.82 
Similarly, there has been academic resistance in the United 
States to what some describe as the “rotten social background” 
defense. Professor Paul H. Robinson argues that this defense should 
not substantially affect judge’s views, because “crime-control 
doctrines of general deterrence and incapacitation would not support 
an excuse in such cases.”83 Robinson cites the major purposes of 
criminal law as just punishment, rehabilitation, incapacitation and 
deterrence,84 and believes that allowing evidence of the defendant’s 
background as an excuse will undermine these goals:85 mitigated 
sentencing based on an individual’s background will weaken 
criminal law’s credibility and ability to deliver what is perceived as a 
just punishment by going against society’s intuitions of justice; it 
will undermine deterrence because future criminals may believe that 
they will be relieved of the consequences of their crime; and it will 
potentially defeat the purpose of incapacitating dangerous 
individuals.86  
                                                
80 JACOBSON & HOUGH, supra note 74, at 23, 32. 
81 Id.  
82 Stephen P. Garvey, Aggravation and Mitigation in Capital Cases: What Do 
Jurors Think? 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1538, 1565–66 (1998). This paper analyzes data 
collected by the Capital Jury Project in South Carolina, which questioned selected 
random sample of jurors from forty-one capital cases in 1993. Id. 
83 Paul H. Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for 
Criminal Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten 
Social Background”, 2 ALA. CIV. RTS. & CIV. LIBERTIES L. REV. 53, 54 (2011).  
84 See, e.g., Paul H. Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Distribution of Criminal 
Sanctions, 82 NW. U.  L. REV. 19, 19 (1987). 
85 Robinson, supra note 83, at 61–62.  
86 Id.  
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In order for mitigation to truly align with society’s intuitions 
of justice, Robinson argues, the individual’s upbringing must be so 
far removed from the public’s experiences that it is not just worse 
than what most people experience, but it is worse in a different and 
objectively more extreme way: “qualitatively worse.”87 Robinson 
cites one case in which a teenager abducted and sexually abused 
other children because he himself was subject to constant sexual 
abuse as a child and educated, by his abuser, to believe that this 
behavior was normal. 88  The extreme trauma this child endured 
should not be considered to be a mitigating factor because, Robinson 
argues, even an upbringing like this one “is only quantitatively 
different from the struggles, disappointments, temptations, 
deprivations, and outrages that most people experience in their daily 
lives. It is worse, but it is not qualitatively worse.”89 In other words, 
plenty of people are subjected to abusive and irrational caregivers, 
and not all become criminals; this story is merely a particularly bad 
example. In contrast, where a prisoner of war was systematically 
brainwashed in a North Korean prison camp experienced something 
“qualitatively worse” than the average human being.90 As Robinson 
puts it, the individual’s circumstances were “so unusual and so apart 
from the nature of people's daily lives that they could easily shift the 
blame for the offense to the effects of having been ‘brainwashed.’”91 
Therefore, Robinson argues, there is a case for mitigation in the latter 
case, but not the former.  
 However, there are several reasons why these arguments are 
inapplicable to the case for sentence mitigation of former child 
soldiers. First, Robinson primarily discusses the fact that one’s 
background should not be an excuse. I do not argue that the 
background of a child soldier should be a defense, but that it should 
be a consideration in sentencing. It does not affect the guilt or 
innocence of the party, but only their punishment.  
Second, as Robinson points out, a “qualitatively different” 
background is distinguished from one that is “quantitatively 
                                                
87 Id. at 76. 
88 Id. at 69–73 (discussing the case of Alex Cabarga).  
89 Id. at 76. 
90 Id. at 65–68, 76 (discussing the case of Richard Tenneson). 
91 Id. at 76. 
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worse.” 92  While individuals in developed nations surely do 
experience violence at home and in poor communities, it is 
drastically different from that experienced by children fighting in the 
armed forces, often against their families and neighbors. Simply put, 
child soldiers live in a constant state of war. In addition to being 
victims of torture, sexual violence, and regular beatings, they 
regularly witness murder, rape, forced amputations, and other forms 
of torture.93 If any situation is “qualitatively worse,” it is that of a 
child soldier. The Sierra Leonean child’s description of finding 
oneself surrounded by flying bullets, other dying children, and blood 
is particularly demonstrative of the extreme nature of this violence.94  
Furthermore, as literature suggests, 95  the more extreme 
violence to which children are exposed, the more extreme the effects 
on their mental capacity and development. It is likely that many child 
soldiers experience much more extreme psychological problems than 
those individuals exposed to more common forms of abuse and 
neglect. Therefore, the case for personal mitigation on grounds of 
mental illness is also much stronger in former child soldiers than in 
civilians.  
Third, mitigation in these sentences is also logical when we 
consider the purposes of criminal law. The mitigation I suggest—one 
of a lower sentence—will not substantially affect rehabilitation, 
incapacitation, or deterrence. First, more severe or longer sentences 
are not likely to affect whether individuals are deterred from crime. 
Instead, several studies have shown that deterrence is more closely 
linked to the certainty of the punishment.96 Individuals are much 
                                                
92 Of course, there are plenty of arguments that a sufficiently “quantitatively” 
worse background should also be cause for mitigation, and that child soldiers reach 
that level of trauma. This, though, this is a subjective assessment, and because it is 
clear that child soldiers experience an upbringing that is also “qualitatively” worse, 
it is not necessary to determine how much worse is enough for mitigation in the 
case of quantitative differences. 
93 See supra Part II.  
94 See supra text accompanying note 28.  
95 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.  
96  VALARIE WRIGHT, THE SENTENCING PROJECT, DETERRENCE IN CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE: EVALUATION CERTAINTY VS. SEVERITY OF PUNISHMENT, 6 (2010); see 
also generally ANDREW VON HIRSCH ET AL., CRIMINAL DETERRENCE AND 
SENTENCE SEVERITY: AN ANALYSIS OF RECENT RESEARCH (1999) (finding that 
increased severity of sentences does not increase deterrence); Daniel Nagin & Greg 
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more likely to be deterred if they are more likely to get caught, while 
changing the length or severity of a sentence does not seem to 
substantially affect deterrence.97 Therefore, mitigation is unlikely to 
make a major impact on the deterrent effect of these sentences.  
Second, a slight decrease in a sentence, for example, from 
Sesay’s sentence of fifty-two years to forty, will not defeat the 
purpose of incapacitation of dangerous individuals. First, the age of 
the individuals tried and the lengths of their sentences mean that they 
are often in their seventies and eighties when released, ages when 
individuals are much less likely to commit crimes.98 This is likely 
more true of former child soldiers, who when incarcerated will be 
removed from the armed conflict and the environment that 
encourages their actions and fuels their violent tendencies. Due to the 
fact that their sentences are likely to be forty or fifty years, many 
armed conflicts may in fact be resolved when these individuals are 
released. Furthermore, if it is judged that the individual is too 
dangerous to be released earlier, the judge or jury still has this 
discretion, and mitigation can take the form of an option for earlier 
parole rather than a guaranteed shorter sentence. Finally, 
rehabilitation can still be a part of sentencing, even if the sentence 
itself is shorter.  
However, mitigation can have a positive effect on whether 
the punishment is just for the individual under the concept of desert 
or moral blameworthiness. Robinson defines a just punishment as 
“the punishment of an offender in relation to the degree of his moral 
blameworthiness for the conduct or omission constituting the 
offense.”99 While a background as a child soldier may not affect the 
                                                                                                             
Pogarsky, Integrating Celerity, Impulsivity, and Extralegal Sanction Threats into a 
Model of General Deterrence: Theory and Evidence, 39 CRIMINOLOGY 865 (2001) 
(finding that certainty of punishment was a much more “robust deterrent” than 
severity); David Farrington et al, Changes in Crime and Punishment in America, 
England and Sweden between the 1980s and the 1990s, 3 STUDY ON CRIME 
PREVENTION 104 (1994) (finding a correlation between probability of conviction 
and decreasing crime rates, but not crime rates and severity of punishment).   
97 See WRIGHT, supra note 97. 
98 See, e.g., Travis Hirschi & Michael Gottfredson, Age and the Explanation of 
Crime, 89 AM. J. SOC. 552, 554–56 (1983).  
99 Robinson, Hybrid Principles for the Disruption of Criminal Sanctions, supra 
note 83, at 19 n.1.  
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culpability of an individual, it may have profound effects on the 
individual’s moral blameworthiness, given his or her disrupted 
development and lack of choice in childhood.100 An individual who 
grows up in a context of war, initially forced to commit crimes, and 
who does not have the mental capacity to fully develop an 
independent ideology is unlikely to morally deserve the same 
punishment as one who lacks these negative influences. Robinson 
further points out that generally intuitions of justice tend to favor 
lenience in cases of “coercive indoctrination,” or brainwashing an 
individual to believe a certain ideology. 101  The systematic 
indoctrination of violence and drug addiction that child soldiers 
receive certainly demonstrates that they fall into this category.  
 
  C.  Potential Objections to Mitigation 
 
There are several objections that may be presented regarding 
the proposal to mitigate sentences of former child soldiers charged 
with crimes. The first is the fact that former child soldiers are most 
likely to be accused of what are, by definition, the most extreme 
crimes: crimes against humanity, war crimes, or genocide.102 The 
level of violence perpetrated by child soldiers is much higher than 
the crimes in the U.K. study, or even of many capital cases. Former 
child soldiers may also be unwilling to express regret or apologize, 
or may resist rehabilitation, which also weakens their case. However, 
the seriousness of their background can explain some of these 
responses. Even as adults, child soldiers have experienced very little 
outside of working in a violent militia, and are unlikely to be 
mentally capable of instant remorse or even an understanding of their 
crimes when they are first removed from the armed forces.  
More importantly, the sentences for crimes committed by 
child soldiers are in no way comparable to those for shoplifting, 
                                                
100 See Jacobson & Hough, supra note 74, at 39.  
101 Robinson, Are We Responsible for Who We Are? The Challenge for Criminal 
Law Theory in the Defenses of Coercive Indoctrination and “Rotten Social 
Background”, supra note 83, at 68–69, 72–74.   
102 The Rome Statute defines the crimes under its jurisdiction—crimes against 
humanity, war crimes, genocide, and the crime of aggression—as the “most serious 
crimes of concern to the international community”. Rome Statute supra note 11, 
preamble, Article 5.  
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burglary, and other lesser offenses, and mitigation should be adjusted 
accordingly. For example, in the U.K. study, mitigation for minor 
crimes often took the form of a demand for an apology, a deferred 
sentence conditioned on finding work, or a fine, instead of 
incarceration.103 I do not suggest that these sentences should be 
considered for individuals guilty of war crimes, but instead, judges 
and lawyers should consider slight reductions in time, for example, 
forty instead of fifty years, depending on an individual’s 
background.104 Mitigation of serious crimes should simply be judged 
on a different scale than minor crimes. This also counters the concern 
that there are no options for care outside of the criminal justice 
system for individuals with mental illness. I do not recommend 
substituting psychological care for incarceration, unless the case is 
particularly extreme, but instead mitigation with a shorter sentence, 
making the absence of other forms of care irrelevant.  
The second objection is that most jurisdictions do not 
stipulate that mitigation should be provided for disorders like PTSD, 
mental problems, or a difficult upbringing; as the study in the United 
Kingdom shows, judges may choose to reduce sentences, but often 
do not.105 I agree that it would be problematic for there to be an 
automatic and prescribed mitigation of sentence for former child 
soldiers; each case is different, and while a history of severe trauma 
and mental problems are likely present in most former child soldiers, 
the extent of their problems must be individually assessed before it 
can be determined what mitigation is appropriate. Instead, I suggest 
that the psychological effects of being a former child soldier merely 
be considered when a sentence is being fashioned. 
                                                
103 JACOBSON & HOUGH, supra note 74, at 26.  
104 Issa Sesay received several jail terms that could be served concurrently. The 
longest was fifty-two years in prison, so I have used his sentence as an example. 
WAR DON DON supra note 2.  Note that most international courts do not prescribe 
the death penalty and, as evidenced by Sesay’s sentence, often prescribe lower 
sentences than U.S. courts, which do allow the death penalty. Therefore, mitigation 
in international courts is difficult to compare to U.S. courts, because the scales of 
punishment are usually different. If a court were to consider a life imprisonment 
term, then mitigation could be adjusted accordingly (for example, a possibility of 
early release). Id. 
105 JACOBSON & HOUGH, supra note 74, at 23, 32. 
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 As discussed in the previous section, mitigation is not a 
novel approach. While there has been pushback to the idea that one’s 
background can offer mitigation, it has been a possibility in both the 
United Kingdom and the United States. 106  Information about 
background and mental state are also commonly introduced during 
trials for other reasons: they have been used as a mental incapacity 
defense, or even defense that the accused does not have the necessary 
criminal culpability. Lawyers have also introduced this evidence 
simply so the jury may hear the information, and potentially decide 
to be lenient with sentencing, without specifically making this 
request.107 
 Specifically, defense lawyers have used the “urban 
psychosis” defense, which states that upbringing in a violent urban 
environment should mitigate a crime, because exposure to violence 
can diminish an individual’s capacity for the necessary mental state 
by “[causing] psychological dysfunction short of full-blown mental 
illness or legal insanity, yet still [having] a significant effect on the 
individual’s behavior.”108 Lawyers have also argued that “urban 
survival syndrome,” where individuals grow up in violent areas and 
develop an extreme defensive attitude and sense of despair, can be a 
mitigating factor. For example, one defendant who gave this defense 
was granted the minimum available sentence. 109  Evidence of 
physical, mental, and emotional abuse have also been introduced as 
mitigating factors in death penalty cases.110 
 Children, of course, are more vulnerable to the effects of 
trauma than adults, and trauma may result in more lasting effects for 
children.111 Children who serve as soldiers are also exposed to, 
subjected to, and participate in some of the most extreme and 
                                                
106 See supra notes 71–75 and accompanying text.  
107 See Falk, supra note 58, at 783.  
108 Id. at 790; see also supra note 77.  
109 Id. at 741; see also supra note 77.  
110 Crocker, supra note 77, at 1166–69; see also, e.g., Harris v. Vasquez, 949 F.2d 
1497, 1505 (1990) (introducing evidence of the defendant’s “horrendous” 
childhood and history of abuse); May v. Collins, 904 F.2d 228, 231 (5th Cir. 1990) 
(per curiam) (detailing the defendant’s childhood abuse and alcoholism); 
Middleton v. Dugger, 849 F.2d 491, 495 (introducing evidence of childhood 
neglect, sexual assault, and drug use).  
111 Falk, supra note 58, at 762–63. 
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sustained violence on a massive scale. Therefore, this mitigation plea 
is well suited to them, and if mitigation can be used in cases of urban 
survival syndrome or urban psychosis, it is not a significant 
departure to suggest that it be used for former child soldiers.  
 The third objection is that allowing mitigation for these 
crimes could be a “slippery slope,” encouraging lawyers to argue for 
mitigation based on any mental condition or history at all, no matter 
how ridiculous. Obviously the experiences of child soldiers are much 
more extreme than most cases and therefore much less prone to 
outrageous claims in the first place.112 However, to avoid the slippery 
slope issue, judges may set some limiting factors in arguments for 
mitigation. For example, a judge may reject evidence if the case is 
particularly unconvincing, if the individual joined the armed forces at 
a later age, if the individual joined voluntarily, or if there are other 
indications that the individual’s experience as a child soldier did not 
significantly impact his or her decision-making. Therefore, 
arguments may be considered on a case-by-case basis. Further, if 
judges are able to exercise discretion as to what evidence is admitted 
in the first place, there is no reason that allowing mitigation 
arguments for former child soldiers will open the door to additional 
defense arguments any more than allowing the use of an insanity 
defense.  
 Finally, some may object that being abducted into the armed 
forces and forced to commit crimes is the same as following orders 
to commit a crime, which in most jurisdictions is not accepted as an 
excuse. 113  First, I do not suggest considering a child soldier’s 
                                                
112 For example, U.S. defense attorneys have argued insanity based on defendants’ 
watching violent television or pornography, or even listening to rock music. Id. at 
742–48. 
113 See, e.g., BRIAN OREND, THE MORALITY OF WAR 201 (2013) (“ordinary 
soldiers . . .  remain duty bound not to follow [an immoral order]. If they do follow 
it, they should be charged with war crimes”); Jerry Fowler, The Rome Treaty for 
an International Criminal Court: A Framework of International Justice for Future 
Generation, 6 HUM. RTS. BRIEF 1, 5 (1998) (“[i]f Nuremburg stood for anything, it 
was that “I was only following orders” is not an excuse for war crimes. The 
statutes for the Yugoslav and Rwanda Tribunals likewise specified that superior 
orders could not relieve an individual of criminal responsibility.”) The Rome 
Statute only allows following orders to be an excuse if the individual was under a 
legal obligation to obey the order, the individual was unaware that the order called 
for an illegal act, and the act was not plainly illegal. Id.  
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background as an excuse, but merely a mitigating factor. It is also 
important to consider that children tend to follow orders much more 
blindly than adults do and do not necessarily have a sense that what 
they are doing is wrong.114 Young children do not fully understand 
the “concept of individual and minority rights juxtaposed with state 
power,” and they truly have no concept of their ability to resist an 
order based on their sense of morality.115 Beyond the fact that 
children’s brains are not fully developed to understand the idea of 
morality, children are taught to blindly follow adults’ instructions 
from birth. As seen in the Mozambique cases, child soldiers are 
further taught to be devoid of emotion and follow all orders without 
question.116 This upbringing may also interfere with the development 
of independent thought.  
Ultimately, while I do not argue that there should be an 
exception to the bar on the excuse of following orders for former 
child soldiers, I believe it should be considered when sentencing. 
Growing up in the armed forces may inalterably change an 
individual’s capacity to resist orders, and child soldiers should 
therefore be afforded leniency in their ability to develop a sense 
between right and wrong.  
 
IV.  Conclusion and Recommendations 
 
Issa Sesay is not an innocent man. It is not difficult to 
understand why he deserves his prison sentence, which will keep him 
incarcerated into his eighties. The RUF was responsible for some of 
the most atrocious crimes in recent memory, and Sesay was a senior 
commander of a group of people responsible for killing, terrorizing, 
maiming, raping and enslaving the citizens of Sierra Leone. It is not 
easy to find sympathy for an individual like Sesay, despite his 
difficult background. To consider a mitigating factor in a case like 
Sesay’s, we must believe on some level that the fact that he 
committed these crimes is understandable. This is not an easy thing 
for a judge or jury to do, at least in part because it is not easy for a 
judge or jury to understand what it means to be a child soldier. The 
                                                
114 See supra Part II. 1.  
115 Grossman, supra note 11, at 348–49.  
116 Boothby, supra note 12, at 248–49. .  
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lives of child soldiers go far beyond any difficult childhood 
mitigation argument that is made in a domestic court in a developed 
country. Child soldiers are repeatedly and systematically beaten, 
starved, drugged, and raped. They watch as their peers and families 
are killed and tortured. Child soldiers cannot escape because they 
have no authority figure to support rather than exploit them. Child 
soldiers effectively spend their formative years being brainwashed in 
an environment where violence is logical and natural, power is the 
only currency, and they wield a machine gun.  
Adults who commit crimes as adults should not be stripped of 
culpability because they were once child soldiers; they are still adults 
and should be tried as such. However, the psychological effects of 
being a child soldier are profound and may affect an individual’s 
ability to determine right and wrong or control his or her actions. 
First, trauma as a child increases the likelihood of mental illness as 
an adult, and mental illness may increase the likelihood of criminal 
behavior later in life. Second, exposure to violent crime may cause a 
child to be more violent in the future. Finally, life as a child soldier 
may impair individuals’ moral development due to their exposure to 
violence at a crucial point in their neurological development. All 
these factors indicate that the mental health of former child recruits 
like Sesay may be so affected by their time as child soldiers that they 
deserve some mitigation in sentencing.  
 With this in mind, I have several recommendations for 
judges, prosecutors, and defense lawyers to consider when dealing 
with crimes committed by former child soldiers. These guidelines are 
particularly important for international tribunals such as the ICC, 
which, as demonstrated in the Lubanga judgment,117 will likely have 
to deal with issues of children being recruited into the armed forces 
in many future cases. Furthermore, the ICC’s statute grants it 
jurisdiction only over crimes against humanity, war crimes, 
genocide, and crimes of aggression, so it is by definition dealing with 
individuals who have been exposed to the most extreme forms of 
violence.118 
                                                
117 Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, ICC-01/04-01/06, Judgment Pursuant to 
Article 74 of the Statute ¶ 1358 (Mar. 14, 2012). 
118 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 5, entered into force July 
1, 2002, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90. 
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First, in cases where individuals who were in the armed 
forces at or below the age of eighteen, and particularly if they were 
in the forces below the age of fifteen, judges should admit evidence 
about the child’s past as a recruit.119 This is especially important for 
those who were abducted or recruited under traumatic circumstances, 
exposed to extreme violence, or joined the army at an especially 
young age, as they may be more adversely affected than others. 
Second, judges should allow scientific evidence or expert testimony 
on the psychological effects of these childhood experiences, and 
particularly their effect on a future propensity for violence or 
ideological development. When sentencing, judges should consider 
mitigating the sentences for those who were raised in this culture of 
extreme violence at a young age, particularly if the individual 
exhibits signs of mental disorders or disrupted moral development. 
This mitigation could take the form of, for example, a shorter 
sentence; an earlier eligibility for parole; or a shorter sentence with 
the condition that the individual receive psychiatric treatment, 
dependent on the treatment’s results.  
In addition, prosecutors should be familiar with the effects 
extreme violence has on children and take into consideration how it 
may affect their adult behavior and propensity for violence. Again, 
this is particularly important for prosecutors who work in 
international tribunals, as they will often be presented not only with 
defendants who are exposed to violence, but also with witnesses and 
civilians. If a child’s history suggests that he or she has been exposed 
to violence extreme enough to disrupt ideological development or 
cause mental disorders, prosecutors should consider recommending 
shorter sentences. To this end, international tribunals such as the ICC 
should consider training lawyers and judges on the effects of child 
trauma, particularly if cases before the court involve former child 
soldiers or conflicts where children are widely used.  
Additionally, defense lawyers must make it a priority to learn 
about a client’s background and history in the armed forces to 
determine if a history as a child soldier could affect the client’s 
                                                
119 See supra text accompanying note 11 (discussing the different standards of the 
age of a child in international law). While some documents, such as the 
Convention on the Rights of the Child, recognize a child as anyone under eighteen, 
it is fairly universal that anyone under the age of fifteen qualifies as a child. Id.   
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current behavior. Psychological assessments should be used to 
determine if clients suffer from a mental disorder or other effects of 
trauma, such as PTSD or depression. Defense lawyers should also 
familiarize themselves with mitigation arguments such as those cited 
by Jacobson and Hough and be prepared to use them in court. They 
should also seek to admit evidence of psychological trauma, history 
of the client, and the effect of violence on adult behavior.  
Finally, I believe that there is much more work that needs to 
be done in this area. While many studies have been done on the 
mental difficulties of child soldiers who were rescued while still 
classified as children, there is very little information to indicate how 
continued presence in an armed group from childhood onward might 
affect behavior and mental health in adults. As armed conflicts in 
places like the DRC continue or associated groups like the LRA 
remain active there are likely to be many more individuals coming 
before international tribunals who were abducted as children and 
grew up in the armed forces. More information is needed on the 
development and mental state of these individuals to better determine 
how their moral development and mental health are affected. With 
more insight into the connection between the unique trauma 
experienced by child soldiers and their later criminal behavior, we 
can better determine how to treat these unique victim-perpetrator 
hybrids at sentencing.  
